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Abstract 
In health research, machine learning (ML) is often hailed as the new frontier of data analytics which, 
combined with big data, will purportedly revolutionise delivery of healthcare and ultimately lead to 
more informed public health policy and clinical decision-making. However, much of the promise of 
ML is predicated on prediction, which is fundamentally distinct from causal inference. Nevertheless, 
these two concepts are often conflated in practice. We briefly consider the sources of this 
conflation, and the implications it has for modelling practices and subsequent interpretation, in the 
context of generalised linear models (GLMs). We then go on to consider the implications for ML 
methods (which are typically applied to prediction tasks), and offer lessons for researchers seeking 
to use ML for both prediction and causal inference. Our primary aim is to highlight the key 
differences between models for prediction and causal inference in order to encourage the critical 
and transparent application of ML to problems in health research. 
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1 Introduction 
‘Machine learning’ (ML) has become a ubiquitous buzzword in computing science, data analytics, 
and other related disciplines. The term refers to the automated, typically algorithmic, detection of 
meaningful patterns in data, and may thus be viewed as a branch of artificial intelligence (AI).1 In 
health research, ML is often hailed as the new frontier of data analytics which, combined with big 
data, will purportedly revolutionise delivery of healthcare (e.g. through ‘personalised medicine’), 
provide new and important insights into disease processes, and ultimately lead to more informed 
public health policy and clinical decision-making.2-6 
There is, however, growing public unease surrounding the use of ML algorithms in general and their 
unintended adverse consequences in specific instances.7-10 Although important, we do not seek to 
directly reiterate these concerns; we instead direct our focus to another issue that has gone largely 
unrecognised in current discussions about ML but which nevertheless has important practical 
consequences for research utilising ML – the conflation of prediction and causation. 
Prediction and causal explanation are fundamentally distinct tasks of data analysis.11 A thorough 
discussion of this distinction is given by Shmueli,12 yet the analytical implications are poorly 
recognised in much of health research, for which the distinction can be understood in terms of the 
difference between prognosis (prediction) and prevention/treatment (causal explanation). For this 
reason, we attempt here to simply and concisely illustrate the key differences between prediction 
and causal inference in the context of generalised linear models (GLMs), and to outline the potential 
consequences of failing to acknowledge and respect these differences. We then go on to consider 
the implications for ML methods (which have historically been applied to prediction tasks), and offer 
lessons for researchers seeking to use ML for both prediction and causal inference. Our primary aim 
is to encourage the critical and transparent application of ML to problems in health research, and to 
encourage the integration of modern causal inference methods into ML practice. 
2 A brief introduction to generalised linear models (GLMs) and 
historical sources of confusion 
Multiple (linear) regression models estimate the expected value 𝐸(∗) of a single variate 𝑌 (the 
‘dependent’ or ‘outcome’ variable) from a linear combination of a set of observed covariates 
𝑋1, … , 𝑋𝑛 (the ‘independent’ or ‘explanatory’ variables, or simply ‘predictors’), as in: 
𝐸(𝑌) = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑋1 + ⋯ + ?̂?𝑛𝑋𝑛 
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GLMs offer greater flexibility to accommodate a wider range of outcome distributions by allowing a 
function of the outcome (i.e. the ‘link function’ 𝑓(∗)) to vary linearly with respect to the covariates, 
as in: 
 𝑓(𝐸(𝑌)) = ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑋1 + ⋯ + ?̂?𝑛𝑋𝑛  (Eq.1) 
The coefficients ?̂?0, ?̂?1, … , ?̂?𝑛 for a given GLM are typically obtained via a statistical process known as 
‘maximum likelihood estimation’, which determines the values which make the observed data ‘most 
likely’.13 Although GLMs are theoretically simple to understand and implement, estimating their 
parameters without the aid of a computing device quickly becomes intractable as the number of 
covariates grows. 
The emergence of programmable desktop computers in the 1980s and 1990s therefore facilitated a 
revolution in data analytics, since it became possible to perform both swiftly and automatically the 
complex matrix inversions required for generalised linear modelling. However, the routine 
application of generalised linear modelling that became established and entrenched was unwittingly 
predicated on prediction, rather than causal explanation. 
Standard GLMs are agnostic to the causal structure of the data to which they are fitted. The process 
of fitting a GLM makes no assumptions about causality, nor does it enable any conclusions about 
causality to be drawn without further strong assumptions. Pearl’s work on graphical causal models 
(often in the form of directed acyclic graphs – DAGs) provides a formal framework for causal 
inference using GLMs by explicating the assumptions required to interpret individual coefficients as 
causal effects.14-16 However, utilisation of this framework (and, indeed, recognition of its existence) 
has been limited in health research.17, 18 
As a result (and despite consistent reminders that ‘correlation does not imply causation’), it remains 
common practice to endow the estimated coefficients for individual covariates with causal meaning, 
often on the basis of ‘statistical significance’. This may be done explicitly or implicitly, as in a recent 
(though by no means unique) high-profile study which found a significant association between active 
commuting and lower risk of cardiovascular disease but then used this as the basis for 
recommending initiatives that support active commuting.19  
Persistent confusion has also been created by much of the language used to describe the 
relationships between a dependent variable and its ‘predictors’, which often serves to conflate 
correlational relationships with causal ones. Perhaps the most notorious example of this is the term 
‘risk factor’, which has both associational and causal connotations across different contexts.20, 21  
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These factors have combined to produce ambiguity about how GLMs for prediction differ from GLMs 
for causal inference, often resulting in the conflation of two distinct concepts. 
3 GLMs for prediction and causal inference 
Models for prediction are concerned with optimally deriving the likely value (or risk) of an outcome 
(i.e. 𝑌 in Eq.1) given information from one or more ‘predictors’, a key task of risk prediction and 
prognosis. In contrast, models for causal inference are concerned with optimally deriving the likely 
change in an outcome (i.e.  ?̂?𝑖 for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛) due to (potentially hypothetical) change in a particular 
covariate (i.e. 𝑋𝑖), a key task of prevention and treatment. Models for prediction and causal 
inference are thus fundamentally distinct in terms of their purpose and utility, and methods 
optimised for one cannot be assumed to be optimal for the other.  
GLMs for prediction and causal inference differ with respect to:  
 The covariates that should be considered for inclusion in (and possibly exclusion from) the 
model; 
 How a suitable set of covariates to include in the model is determined; 
 Which covariates are ultimately selected, and what functional form (i.e. parameterisation) 
they take; 
 How the model is evaluated; and 
 How the model is interpreted. 
To illustrate these differences, we use for context a recent study by Pabinger et al.22 published in the 
Lancet Haematology which concerns venous thromboembolism (VTE), a common complication of 
cancer in which a blood clot forms in a deep vein and then becomes lodged in the lungs. We 
consider how two research questions – one predictive, one causal – might be addressed using 
logistic regression (i.e. GLMs with the ‘logit’ link function) in this context, and conclude with a more 
general discussion regarding the implications these differences have for the application and 
interpretation of GLMs in health research. 
 Prediction modelling 
The ultimate utility of a prediction model lies in its ability to accurately predict the outcome of 
interest. Such information may be used to anticipate the outcome – either to simply prepare for its 
occurrence or to inform a subsequent intervention that attempts to alter it. 
In our clinical context, for instance, a prediction model for VTE in cancer patients could be used to 
identify individuals at heightened risk of VTE solely so that they can be more carefully monitored in 
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hospital, or so that they can receive treatment with low-molecular-weight heparin23 in order to 
reduce the risk that has been predicted.  
The prediction research question (and that which is addressed by Pabinger et al.22) can thus be 
framed as: 
Which cancer patients are most (or least) likely to develop VTE? 
3.1.1 Which covariates should be considered for inclusion in the model? 
Variables which are hypothesised to be useful ‘predictors’ of the outcome should be identified; 
these are variables which are likely to be associated with the outcome, though not necessarily 
directly causally related to it. As an example, Pabinger et al.22 consider D-dimer concentration as a 
possible covariate. D-dimer is a protein that is present in the blood only after the coagulation system 
has been activated, and thus a marker for the existence of a blood clot rather than a cause of it.  
Practical considerations often restrict the set of variables that are considered. For example, where a 
specific dataset has already been chosen, only variables which appear in this dataset are considered 
for inclusion. Variables that are easy to measure and/or record are also preferred, in order to 
improve the practical utility of the final model.  
3.1.2 How are covariates selected for inclusion in the model, which covariates are ultimately 
selected, and how are they parameterised? 
Methods for narrowing down the set of ‘candidate’ covariates are generally automatic and/or 
algorithmic in nature (e.g. best subsets regression, forwards/backwards stepwise or change-in-
estimate procedures24) and operate within a restricted range of the infinite potential parametric 
space. These methods evaluate different possible covariate subsets and parameterisations according 
to some specified criteria in order to arrive at a suitable model. Pabinger et al.,22 for instance, 
implement the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) combined with a backwards 
selection algorithm to narrow down their twenty ‘candidate’ covariates to just two – tumour site 
and (log-transformed) D-dimer concentration. 
The covariates that are ultimately selected are those which, as a group, are deemed to efficiently 
maximise the amount of joint information relative to the outcome. Selecting the ‘optimal’ subset of 
covariates typically involves a trade-off between ‘explaining’ the maximum amount of variation in 
the outcome and creating a parsimonious model that is likely to fit other similar datasets. Additional 
complexity – in the form of more covariates and more complex parameterisations – is likely to 
increase the predictive capabilities of the model, but at the expense of external validity. This trade-
off is made explicit in many of the criteria used for subset selection, including adjusted R2 and 
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penalised likelihood-based measures such as Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC).13  
3.1.3 How is the model evaluated? 
The model is assessed via statistical evaluation of the overall model, with little focus on the specific 
choice of model covariates and limited reference (if any) to exogenous theoretical constructs 
informed by the context of the model. Examples of common ‘goodness-of-fit’ criteria include root 
mean squared error of residuals, (adjusted) R2, and receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curves.  
Oftentimes, the performance of the model is assessed using a different dataset than that which was 
used to build it, so as to evaluate its wider validity.  
3.1.4 How is the model interpreted? 
The prediction model provides information about the expected value (or risk) of an outcome, given 
data on the covariates in the model. The model does not provide information about how to change 
the expected value (or risk) of an outcome. The consequences of any (hypothetical) intervention to 
change the outcome may be estimated from external knowledge (e.g. clinical trial results for low-
molecular-weight heparin treatment23) but are unknowable from the model itself without further 
strong assumptions.  
The model also cannot indicate which individual predictors are most relevant, as the set of 
predictors ultimately selected depends upon the initial set of ‘candidate’ predictors and the 
parameterisations considered. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the variables which, as a group, 
accurately predict the outcome have any sensible interpretation (causal or otherwise) in isolation. 
Even attempting to qualitatively or quantitatively rank the ‘contribution’ of different predictors 
should not be attempted, since both the magnitude and sign of each predictor are conditional on the 
inclusion of all others. Nevertheless, it is unfortunately not uncommon for authors to interpret 
individual covariates in this way.25, 26 
 Causal modelling 
The goal of causal explanation is to estimate the true causal associationa between a particular 
variable (often referred to as the ‘exposure’) and the outcome, by removing all other hypothesised 
associations which distort that relationship. Such information may then be used to attempt to alter 
the outcome by altering the exposure.  
                                                          
a We restrict our analysis here to considering the ‘total’ causal effect, since additional complexities arise in the 
estimation of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ (i.e. ‘mediated’) causal effects.27 
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In the context of a GLM, the causal association of interest is represented by the coefficient of the 
exposure variable; removing all spurious associations is achieved in principle by also including as 
covariates a sufficient set of variables which ‘control for’ those associations.  
Returning to our clinical example, chemotherapy has been identified as a ‘risk factor’ for VTE.28 
However, determining to what degree it increases the risk of VTE compared to other treatments or 
interventions (e.g. no chemotherapy) requires a robust estimate of the causal effect of 
chemotherapy on VTE risk.  
The causal research question can thus be framed as: 
To what degree does chemotherapy increase the risk of developing VTE? 
3.2.1 Which covariates should be considered for inclusion in the model? 
Variables which are hypothesised to create or transmit spurious associations between the exposure 
and outcome should be identified and considered for inclusion in the model. The most familiar of 
such associations is confounding, which arises due to one or more common causes of the exposure 
and outcome. The causal effect of chemotherapy on risk of VTE, for example, is likely to be 
confounded by tumour size, since this is often taken into consideration when deciding whether to 
initiate chemotherapy and also likely affects subsequent VTE risk.  
In causal modelling, it is equally as important to identify variables that should be excluded from 
consideration. For example, spurious associations may arise due to an under-recognised 
phenomenon known as ‘collider bias’, in which ‘controlling for’ a common causal descendent (i.e. a 
‘collider’) induces an additional non-causal dependency between the exposure and outcome.29, 30 
Variables which transmit part of the causal association of interest should also be excluded. 
The process of identifying covariates to potentially include or exclude should not be limited by what 
is available in a particular dataset, since spurious associations between the exposure and outcome 
do not simply cease to exist if they are ignored.31, 32 
3.2.2 How are covariates selected for inclusion in the model, which covariates are ultimately 
selected, and how are they parameterised? 
The covariates ultimately selected for inclusion in the model must, as a group: 
1. ‘Control for’ all spurious associations, 
2. Not ‘control for’ any of the causal association, and 
3. Not create any additional spurious associations.33 
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Graphical causal models (often in the form of DAGs) are of enormous utility to covariate selection in 
causal modelling. These models consist of a set of nodes (variables) connected by a set of arrows 
(representing hypothesised direct causal effects), where an arrow from one variable to another 
implies that a change in the first causes a change in the second. Any two variables may also be 
connected by indirect causal pathways, which are sequences of edges which flow in the same 
direction, and paths which transmit spurious associations (e.g. confounding paths).15, 33 A simplified 
DAG for our example scenario is provided in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
The use of a DAG provides a transparent means of spelling out the causal assumptions underlying a 
given scenario. Moreover, the subset(s) of covariates which satisfy the three conditions identified 
previous may be identified algorithmically,34 since in a DAG framework the three conditions 
correspond to covariates which, as a group: 
1. Block all confounding paths, 
2. Do not block any causal paths, and 
3. Do not open any ‘colliding’ paths.33 
For instance, the DAG in Figure 1 implies that age, sex, tumour site, and tumour size should be 
included as covariates in order to estimate the total causal effect of chemotherapy on VTE risk, since 
they confound the relationship of interest; platelet count should be excluded, since it mediates the 
effect of chemotherapy on VTE risk.  
If there exist multiple subsets of covariates which satisfy the three conditions, practical 
considerations may be used to choose between them. For example, subsets containing variables 
which are not available in the intended dataset, or which are otherwise hard to measure accurately, 
may be rejected. 
Once a suitable set of covariates is identified, the goal of covariate parameterisation is to 
appropriately modify the exposure-outcome relationship (i.e. remove the spurious component(s) of 
their association); failure to adequately to ‘control for’ these covariates may result in residual 
confounding.35  
3.2.3 How is the model evaluated? 
A DAG is, by construction, a map of hypothesised statistical dependencies between variables. 
Conversely, it implies certain statistical independencies between variables, the existence of which 
can be tested empirically in the dataset used.34  
 9 
 
Sensitivity analyses may also be employed to estimate the magnitude of biases arising from 
unmeasured confounding, residual confounding, or collider bias.36 
3.2.4 How is the model interpreted? 
The coefficient for the exposure may be interpreted as an estimate of the total causal effect of the 
exposure on the outcome, i.e. the total expected change in the value of the outcome that is due to a 
(potentially hypothetical) change in the value of the exposure. In our example, this corresponds to 
the expected increase in the risk of VTE that is attributable only to initiation of chemotherapy (i.e. all 
else ‘being equal’). Of course, the validity of this estimate is only as good as the validity of the causal 
assumptions underlying it.  
The model does not provide information about the total expected change in the outcome that is due 
to changes in the other model covariates except under extremely restrictive circumstances. In 
general, estimating the effect of a different ‘exposure’ requires a different model. Erroneously 
attempting to interpret multiple coefficients in a single GLM as total causal effects is referred to as 
the ‘Table 2 fallacy’.37  
 Implications 
The distinct goals of prediction and causal explanation result in distinct processes for covariate 
selection and parameterisation, model evaluation, and model interpretation. For these reasons, 
GLMs for prediction and causal explanation are not interchangeable and should not be conflated. 
Any coefficient in a GLM could potentially represent a true causal effect (either direct, total, or a 
subset of the total), an association due to uncontrolled confounding or collider bias, or any 
combination thereof. Interpreting a particular coefficient as an estimate of the total causal effect of 
that covariate on the outcome requires making the assumption that all other covariates in the model 
‘control for’ all spurious associations, do not ‘control for’ any of the causal association, and do not 
create any additional spurious associations. Causal modelling processes have these assumptions 
explicitly built into their foundations, but prediction modelling processes do not.  
The goal of prediction modelling is to develop a useful tool to forecast an outcome that has yet to 
occur, and so the model-building process is ultimately driven by convenience and other practical 
considerations. It is well-suited to automated methods for covariate selection and parameterisation 
(including ML), because the specific subset of covariates that is ultimately used to predict the 
outcome (and the way in which they are parameterised) is relatively unimportant so long as the 
model has a sufficient degree of internal and external validity. 
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In contrast, the causal model-building process is necessarily driven by external and a priori theory, 
and thus benefits little from algorithmic modelling methodologies such as ML. To estimate the 
causal effect of one variable on another, one must specify both the possible causal pathways 
through which those effects are realised and the possible non-causal pathways that transmit 
spurious associations before any modelling is undertaken. Although the process of identifying a 
suitable subset of covariates which remove all spurious associations between the exposure and 
outcome may be automated once all causal assumptions are made explicit (often in the form of a 
DAG), identifying the initial set of variables and specifying the manner in which they are likely to 
transmit spurious associations cannot be automated.  
4 Lessons for machine learning 
The distinction between modelling strategies for prediction and those for causal inference is not 
widely appreciated in the context of GLMs, despite being the mainstay method for health data 
analysis. Failing to recognise the distinction and its implications in the context of ML risks wasting 
substantial financial resources on building ever-more complex models that have limited real-world 
utility. More hazardous is that these models will not face sufficient scrutiny due to (false) confidence 
bred by new technologies and large sample sizes.  
Many ML methods (e.g. neural networks) essentially perform regression, and thus require equally 
thoughtful implementation. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to imagine that it will soon be as simple 
to perform ML methods in off-the-shelf software as it is to implement GLMs, and that the 
automation which facilitated such confusion in the realm of GLMs will be played out on an even 
larger scale in the realm of ML.  
We therefore offer the following lessons that should be heeded for ML to be used appropriately and 
to greatest effect in health research. 
 The purpose of any model should be specified from the outset, and the 
model built with appropriate respect for this context. 
The distinct purposes of prediction and causal inference require distinct models. To ensure that ML 
methods work effectively in the manner intended, it is paramount that the purpose of any model is 
established from the outset, and that it is then constructed, evaluated, and interpreted with 
appropriate respect for this context. All reporting of methods and results should be consistent with 
this guidance in order to avoid misinterpretation or misapplication of the model. 
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 Contextual knowledge is generally required for both prediction and causal 
inference, and this cannot be automated. 
ML methods provide an automated method for estimating the parameters that map inputs (i.e. 
covariates) to outputs (i.e. outcomes).38 ML methods do not, however, replace contextual 
knowledge, which is generally required for both prediction and causal modelling. 
Specifying the initial set of variables to consider for each model, for instance, requires temporal 
knowledge. A model which includes a variable that occurs after any (hypothetical) intervention to 
alter the outcome is of little use practically, yet an algorithm by itself cannot make this 
determination.  
Requirements for contextual knowledge are even greater for causal modelling, where causal 
assumptions must be specified, ideally before any modelling is undertaken; this is addressed further 
in point 3. 
 Attributing causal effects requires causal assumptions. 
Robust causal evidence from observational data cannot be obtained in a ‘theory-free’ environment. 
Notably, much of the promise of ML is predicated on prediction,38 which prioritises the strength of 
(undirected) associations over the causal structures that give rise to them, and subsequently 
prioritises data-driven over theory-driven model selection.  
Attempting to extract causal meaning from models that have not been built in an explicit causal 
framework ultimately risks patient safety. Whilst it might be argued that prediction in one setting 
helps to inform intervention in another, such transference of inference relies on the ability of a 
single selected ‘predictor’ to provide causal insight, which it cannot do without additional strong 
(causal) assumptions. Unfortunately, there is evidence to suggest that ML methods are already 
beginning to be (mis)used in this manner.39-41 
Integration of modern causal inference methods into ML applications should be sought and 
encouraged for answering causal questions. Indeed, there is already promising research being done 
in this area (e.g.42-46). 
5 Conclusion 
ML has been heralded in health research for its perceived ability to improve patient outcomes by 
automating modelling processes and improving analyses of (big) data. However, this overly-simplistic 
perception has already begun to encourage the adoption of ML methods without sufficient critical 
thought, under the assumption that such methods will simply adapt accordingly to work out an 
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optimal solution. This is not the case. The increasing frequency with which ML is being used in health 
research mirrors the rise of the GLM as the standard method for data analysis, and will likely suffer 
many of the same problems (on a vastly larger scale) if the lessons from GLMs are not heeded.  
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7 Figures 
Figure 1 
 
Figure 1: Directed acyclic graph (DAG) depicting the hypothesised causal relationship between 
chemotherapy (the ‘exposure’, in green) and VTE (the ‘outcome’, in blue); causal pathways are 
highlighted in green. Age, sex, tumour site, and tumour size (all in red) confound the relationship 
between Chemotherapy and VTE, and so should be included as covariates in the GLM in order to 
estimate the total causal effect of Chemotherapy on VTE risk. Platelet count mediates the 
relationship between Chemotherapy and VTE, and so should not be included as a covariate in the 
GLM in order to estimate the total causal effect of chemotherapy on VTE risk. 
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